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non-employment. We account for selective participation on the basis of a multivariate
duration model with correlated unobserved heterogeneity. Our estimates indicate
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11 Introduction
Most member states of the European Union have experienced high unemployment rates
for a long time and spend a considerable share of their GDP on active labour market
policies (OECD (2004)).1
In this paper we estimate the effect of participation in a Belgian active labour market
program (ALMP) in the form of a temporary employment subsidy. The subsidy provides
a reduction in social insurance contributions to employers when recruiting eligible long-
term unemployed workers. Our analysis focuses on young unemployed workers. The
particularly high unemployment rates for this group motivates this choice.2 We estimate
the effect of program-participation on the employment duration, during and after the
temporary subsidy.
We ﬁnd that subsidised employment decreases the transition rate from employment
to non-employment in the ﬁrst year of participation. We don’t ﬁnd signiﬁcant effects on
the transition rates in the second year and after the end of the subsidies.
Although an empirical implementation of a theoretical model is beyond the scope
of this paper it might be useful for the interpretation of our results to take a look at
the theoretical literature. Despite the fact that economists have advocated employment
subsidies for a long time,3 there are only few theoretical models which provide analytical
results concerning the effect of employment subsidies on labour market ﬂows.
One exception is Mortensen and Pissarides (2003) who deliver insight into the effect
of different types of subsidies on job creation and job destruction by integrating subsi-
dies in a search and matching equilibrium framework with endogenousjob-destruction.4
In their analysis they distinguish between two types of subsidies. Hiring subsidies paid
once, at the start of an employment spell and employment subsidies which provide a ﬂow
1See Martin and Grubb (2001) for a review of different active labour market policies.
2Eurostat (2006) reports that the annual harmonised unemployment rate for people younger than 25
years was 18.5 % in 2005 for the European Union (EU-25) compared to 8.7 % for the whole labour force. The
reported statistics are based on the European Union Labour Force Survey.
3See Kaldor (1936) for an early paper which analyses employment subsidies. Phelps (1994) and Snower
(1994) are recent examples.
4Their framework is similar to Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) where job destruction is modelled by
random productivity shocks which lead to destruction when the productivity of a job falls below a match
speciﬁc reservation value. Mortensen and Pissarides (2003) underline the importance of the free entry con-
dition for their results and refer to a paper of Davidson and Woodbury (1995), who ﬁx the total number of
job in a related framework.
2of subsidies during the job duration. Their main ﬁndings can be summarised as follows:
hiring subsidies lead to shorter unemployment durations but increase unemployment
incidence and consequently lead to a higher turnover on the labour market.5 In contrast,
employment subsidies lead to a steady state that is characterised by a lower reservation
productivity. This translates into an increase of the expected employment duration.6 A
temporary employment subsidy shares features with both the hiring and the employ-
ment subsidies. We will come back to this model in section 5, where we present our
results. For now, we can state that Mortensen and Pissarides (2003) show that employ-
ment subsidies potentially affect employment duration.
Despite the widespread use of subsidised employment programs and ongoing efforts
to evaluate them, the picture which is provided by the evaluation literature is mixed.
Martin and Grubb (2001) and Dar and Tzannatos (1999) give an account of the ambiguity
in the estimated effects.
The recent microeconometric evaluation literature has mainly focused on two differ-
ent outcomes.7 A ﬁrst branch of research looks at the probability of being un/employed
(e.g. Caliendo et al. (2005), Gerﬁn et al. (2005)). Others focus on the transition rates out
of unemployment (e.g. Lubjova and van Ours (1999), Fredriksson and Johansson (2004),
Forslund et al. (2004), Göbel (2006)). In these studies the time in subsidised employ-
ment is commonly regarded as time in unemployment. In contrast to this literature we
consider the time in subsidised employment as time in employment. At ﬁrst sight our
approach seems to be optimistic, since generally the aim of participation in labour mar-
ket programs is the integration into employment and not program-participation itself.
However, in the case of subsidised employment program participants can be considered
as employed. If it is the aim of the subsidy program to integrate program-participants
into employment then the effect of participation on the duration of the ﬁrst employment
is a natural candidate for an evaluation analysis. In this paper we focus on the effect
of the subsidies on the duration of the ﬁrst employment. We contrast the duration of
5A hiring subsidy stimulates job creation, however once a job is created the opportunity cost of maintain-
ing the match rises since the hiring subsidy can again be obtained when creating a new job.
6A longer expected life of a new job implies also that the “desired job creation” increases“ and “with it
market tightness”(Mortensen and Pissarides (2003)).
7Macroeconomic evaluation has many desirable features but cannot be applied in our case because of the
small program-size.
3employment that starts by a subsidised employment to what would have happened if
the workers had a direct transition to regular, non-subsidised employment instead. In
our paper, program participation as well as the counterfactual situation are considered
as employment.
It is a problem of microeconometric evaluation studies of subsidised employment
programmes that some of the created jobs would also be created in the absence of the
program (Martin and Grubb (2001)). Our study is less vulnerable to this problem, since
the counterfactual situation is a hypothetical transition into regular employment. Con-
sequently our analysis, which focuses on the employment duration, is valid when the
participant would have had a transition to employment without the subsidy as well.
Despitethehighunemploymentratesforyoungworkersonly fewrecent studieshave
analysed the effect of participation in subsidised employment for this group. Carling and
Larsson (2005) and Larsson (2003) investigate Swedish programs and do not ﬁnd long
term effects on the probability of being in employment after participation in subsidised
employment. Analysing different youth programs in France Brodaty et al. (2001) ﬁnd
that regular ﬁxed term employment has stronger ex-post effects on the probability of be-
ing employed with a long term contract than various subsidised employment programs.
Blundell et al. (2004) evaluate the New-Deal in Great Britain and ﬁnd an important im-
pact on the transitions out of unemployment for a combination of intensive job-search
assistance and subsequent subsidised employment. Our study provides new evidence
for subsidised employment for young workers.
In most European programs the subsidies are provided to the employer. This is dif-
ferent from programs in the US or Canada which often provide incentives on the supply-
side of the labour market.8 If the subsidy is provided to employers who decide how
many subsidised workers they hire we cannot a priori assume that the “participating”
employers are comparable to the non-participating ones. Indeed they might have par-
ticular labour market characteristics. In addition to the usual selection problem for the
participating workers we might face a selection problem on the employer side as well.
To estimate the effect of subsidised employment we have to control for this “double-
8See Eissaand Liebman(1996), Meyerand Rosenbaum (2001) or Hotz etal. (2005) forrecentstudiesonthe
US Income Tax Credit program and Card and Hyslop (2005) for the Canadian Self-sufﬁciency experiment.
See also Meyer (1995) who evaluates different US job-search bonus experiments.
4selection”. Therefore we include a large set of explanatory variables which reﬂect the
characteristics of the workers and employers.
We use an administrative database with matched employer-employee data for our
analysis. The database allows us to construct the labour market histories of Belgian
school leavers. We implement a multivariate competing risk duration model (Abbring
and van den Berg (2003a)). This framework has the advantage that we can test whether
our results are robust with respect to selection in unobserved characteristics of the work-
ers.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a description of the policy-
measure we have evaluated. Section 3 gives a short description of the used database. In
section 4 we develop the econometric model which allows an evaluation of the reduction
of social insurance contributions. Section 5 provides the key result of the estimation and
section 6 concludes.
2 The Belgian “Recruitment Plan”
Before we start with the description of the policy, note that, in Belgium, young people
are particularly concerned by high unemployment rates: 21.5% compared to 8.4% for the
whole labour force in 2005 (Eurostat (2006)). The Belgian unemployment insurance sys-
tem provides unemployment beneﬁts to all involuntary unemployed people who have
sufﬁciently contributed before (OECD (2001)). Different from most other countries un-
employment beneﬁts are even payed to school leavers without work experience after a
waiting period. For the young school leavers considered in this paper the waiting pe-
riod is 9 months. There is no general beneﬁt exhaustion and unemployed people can
receive beneﬁts for an unlimited time.9 The amount of the beneﬁts depends on the fam-
ily type and employment record. For school leavers a ﬂat-rate is applied. In the year
2000 this ﬂat-rate varied between e307/month for cohabitants who are not in charge
of family and e790/month for cohabitants who are in charge of family (ONEM (2000)).
There exist several labour market programmes which try to integrate school leavers into
9See Cockx and Ries (2004) for a detailed description of beneﬁt exhaustion in Belgium.
5employment.10
In this paper we analyse the effect of an employment subsidy program. The program
is called the “Recruitment Plan” and provides subsidies in the form of a reduction in
social insurance contributions on the employer’s side, under certain conditions. Since we
limit our analysis to young long-term unemployed people, we restrict our description to
this group.11
Employers who want to hire workers under the terms of the Recruitment Plan have to
pay social insurance contributions. Only employers from the private sector are eligible.12
Employers who beneﬁt from the Recruitment Plan are not allowed to beneﬁt from other
reductions in social insurance contributions for the same worker at the same time.
Young workers have to be unemployed for at least 12 months “without interruption”,
in order to be entitled to the Recruitment Plan. A period of unemployment is considered
to be “without interruption” when the periods in which the unemployed worker does
not receive unemployment beneﬁts are not longer than four months.13
The subsidy is provided when hiring an entitled unemployed worker. The labour con-
tract must be at least for half-time employment. Roughly speaking the subsidy follows a
two year scheme. In the quarter of hiring and the four subsequent quarters the reduction
is 75% of the base amount of social insurance contributions; from the ﬁfth to the eighth
quarter it is 50%.14 This implies a subsidy amount of roughly 25% of the gross wage in
the ﬁrst year and 17% of the gross wage in the second year. The Recruitment Plan ends
after the eighth quarter.
There is no automatic or external assignment to the program and there is no informa-
tionabout howa workeroran employeractually getsassigned. The absence ofautomatic
assignment is important for the identiﬁcation of the estimated effects since it ensures the
existence of workers who have a ﬂow into regular employment.
10For a detailed descriptions of the different programs we refer to the yearly reports of the national em-
ployment ofﬁce, e.g. ONEM (2000).
11The Recruitment Plan is not limited to young workers. Also older long-term unemployed workers can
participate in this program.
12The following institutions are excluded from the Recruitment Plan: the Belgium state, the three
language-communities, the regions and related institutions.
13For school leavers also the time in the 9 months waiting period is counted as unemployment.
14The Recruitment Plan provides slightly higher subsidies (100%/75%) for workers who have been in
unemployment for more than 24 months. To ensure that we have a clearly deﬁned subsidy program we
exclude participants with more than 24 months of unemployment and we focus on the subsidies which are
provided for workers who have been in unemployment between 12 and 24 months.
6We will see in the next section that despite the relative importance of the reduction in
labour costs only a small fraction of the eligible workers actually participates in the pro-
gram. This points directly to a problem in the implementation of the Recruitment Plan.
Although the law which deﬁnes the eligibility rules and the ﬁnancial advantages of the
program has been published, the program has never been promoted by the unemploy-
ment ofﬁces or the social ofﬁces on a large scale. Even though the low take-up rate is
puzzling at ﬁrst sight, it basically reﬂects that neither the employers nor the unemployed
workers have been informed about the availability of this measure in a systematic way.15
3 Description of the database
Our dataset has been provided by the Belgian “Crossroads Bank for Social Security” and
contains information about young workers. The database combines administrative data
from different institutions of the Belgian social security system.16 Since the database con-
tains information about unemployment, employment, self-employment and inactivity
(identiﬁed by absence in the other databases) we are able to determine individual labour
market histories on a quarterly basis. The observation period is from 1998 to 2000. In
addition we have aggregate information about the workers for the period before 1998.
However we cannot observe the complete individual labour market histories for the pre-
1998 period. This may lead to initial condition problems: preceding labour market histo-
ries are known to have an impact on labour market outcomes. Therefore, ignoring what
happened before the start of the observation period might lead to spurious results in
our analysis. To avoid this problem we choose workers without observed employment
experience.
One starting point for our analysis of young unemployed workers without employ-
ment experience would be to consider their individual labour market history from the
start of unemployment at the end of school. Unfortunately we cannot observe the ﬂow
into unemployment directly after school in our database. Instead we sample the ﬂow in
15Also the simultaneous existence of differentlabour market programs for young workers may play a role
for the explanation for the low participation rates. However there was no more generous program at that
time, nor had the employers or workers any disadvantage by participating.
16The data is from the National Ofﬁce for Social Security (ONSS), National Employment Ofﬁce (ONEM),
National ofﬁce for family beneﬁts for salaried persons (ONAFTS), Social insurance institute for self-
employed workers (INASTI) and the National Institute of Statistics (INS).
7paid-unemployment at the end of the 9 months waiting period.17 This sample is homo-
geneous with respect to the labour market history in the sense that we retain workers
without employment spells before they enter paid-unemployment. We use a sample of
workers who are between 18 and 26 years old when they start their waiting period. Ap-
plying these criteria we get a ﬂow-sample of 16.376 workers who enter paid-unemploy-
ment in 1998, after their waiting period. For the estimation we have to delete further
observations either because of missing data or contradictory values. Finally we keep a
database with 15.217 workers, 8.720 women and 6.497 men.
For a complete description of the variables in our database we refer to table 1 in the
appendix. In this section we limit our description to the subgroup of workers who partic-
ipate in the Recruitment Plan and the control group. The control group consists of workers
who have a direct transition from unemployment to regular employment. We deﬁne reg-
ular employment as employment which starts without participation in an active labour
market policy. The number of young workers who participate in the Recruitment Plan
is relative small compared to the number of those who have a transition to regular em-
ployment. We have 257 (246) women (men) who participate in subsidised employment
compared to3.156 (2.776) in thecontrolgroup. Theremaining 60.8% (53.5%) ofthefemale
(male) workers have either no transition to employment during the observation period
or a transition into inactivity or another ALMP.
First we take a look at the individual characteristics. The average age at the end of
1997 is around 20.5 years for both subgroups. The group of women (men) who have a
transition from unemployment to regular employment contain a slightly higher fraction
of Belgians 91.4% (89.4%) than the subgroup of participants 87.9% (88.6%). For women
who have a transition to regular employment we observe a larger proportion of college
degrees, 26.9% compared to 20.6% for participants.
The month of entry into paid-unemployment corresponds to the month in which the
waiting period is ﬁnished and full unemployment beneﬁts are paid. Note that for work-
ers who ﬁnish compulsory-school education in June the waiting period starts the ﬁrst of
August, if they are enrolled as job-seekers.18 These workers enter paid-unemployment in
17In the following, we refer to paid-unemployment for unemployment with unemployment beneﬁts i.e.
unemployment after the waiting period.
18The time between the end of the school-year and the 1st of August are not considered for the waiting
8April of the year after the enrolment. We can see that an important fraction (around 30%)
of the workers enter paid-unemployment in April. Since a considerable amount of stu-
dents start their waiting period in July, September or October there is also an important
fraction of workers who enter paid-unemployment in March, May or June: 40.5% of the
women and 42.4% of the men. There are two main explanations why workers may enter
in other months - either they have not enrolled as job-seekers immediately after leaving
school or they have not left the school-system at the end of a school year.19
Our database also contains information about characteristics of the workers household.
The largest fraction of workers is reported to be child of the head of the household: More
than 72% (84%) of the women (men). This is a consequence of restricting our analysis
to school-leavers. The remaining workers are either head of the household, spouse of
the head of the household or living in the household without a family relationship to
the head of the household. For each household we distinguish between the number of
children in the age class (0-3] and (3-12]. For details we refer to table 1. On average there
are 2.7 (2.8) persons living in a household for women (men).
Two variables describe the labour market conditions. First, the unemployment rate at
the level of the local unemployment ofﬁce.20 At the start of the observation period, the
unemployment rates for women are considerably higher than for men: 25.7% for the un-
employed women who have a transition to regular employment and 27.6% for women
who participate in subsidised employment in contrast to 17.8% and 19.6% for the respec-
tive groups of men.
The database provides information about the region where the workers live. Around
two thirds of the workers came from the southern, French speaking, Walloon, region
of Belgium. The labour market conditions in the northern, Flemish, region are more
favourable. This leads to less long-term unemployment and consequently the number of
participants from the Flemish region is relatively low.
When it comes to the characteristics of the employer we observe signiﬁcant differences
period by the unemployment ofﬁce. An exception is made for young workers who abandon school before
the end of the courses (ONEM (2005)).
19In Belgium schooling and studies are structured in school years or academic years.
20Thereare30local unemploymentofﬁcesinBelgium. Theunemploymentrate isdeﬁnedas the number of
people who receive full unemployment beneﬁts as a percentage of those who are covered by unemployment
insurance (ONEM (1998)). This is an administrative measure which is different from the deﬁnition of the
International Labour Organisation.
9between regular and subsidised employment. Again, we refer to table 1 for the complete
picture. The sector of the employer is identiﬁed by the NACE-code which is available
at the two-digit level. To make the sector information processable we keep only the 8
largest sectors at the two-digit level and regroup the remaining sectors at the one-digit
level. The sectors on the two-digit level cover almost 75% of the employment spells
in our data-base.21 Furthermore we have a variable which indicates if the employer is
a local public administration (APL) which cannot proﬁt from the Recruitment Plan. A
small fraction of the workers in regular employment is registered as self-employed. The
companies who hire subsidised workers are on average smaller than the companies of
the regular employed workers.
To summarise, we can state that the descriptive statistics of the observed individual
characteristics and of the local labour market for participants and their control group are
similar. However, the observed characteristics of the employer for the two subgroups are
signiﬁcantly different.
Before we describe the survival rates, note that the duration in unemployment is mea-
suredaftertheendofthe9-monthswaitingperiod. Figure1showsthatthenon-parametric
survival rate in unemployment is always higher for women than for men.22 The median
duration in unemploymentfor womenis thus longer than that for men, 16 vs. 13 months.
In ﬁgure 2 and 3 we compare the survival rates in employment for participants and
non-participants. For male as well as for female workers the survival rates in employ-
ment diverge during the ﬁrst 12 months after the quarter of the transition into employ-
ment. The survival rates after 12 months is 8.9% (12.4%) higher for the participating
women (men) compared to the workers who start employment without participation.
This indicates that the average transition rate from employment to non-employment are
lower for the participants at the start of employment. As from the 12th month the sur-
vival rates converge and 30 months after the quarter of entry into employment the sur-
vival rate for female (male) participants are only 5.7% (3.1%) above the survival rates for
non-participants. To summarise the survival rates in employment suggest that the par-
ticipants have a lower transition rate out of employment in the ﬁrst year and a higher
21At the two-digit level we retain food and beverage manufacturing, construction, retail trade, hotels and
restaurants, other business activities, public administration, education and health-sector.
22See Lancaster (1990) for the estimation of non-parametric survival functions.
10transition rate out of employment after the ﬁrst year.23 It is also remarkable that the sur-
vival rates in employment decline fast. One year after the quarter of the transition into
employment almost 50% of the non-participating workers had a transition from employ-
ment to non-employment.
Transition rates are informative about how the labour market ﬂows evolve over time.
Figure 4 shows that the transition rate from unemployment to regular employment dis-
plays a negative time dependence, deﬁned by a transition rate which is decreasing over
time. However, it is well known that disregarding the heterogeneityof the workers leads
to spurious time-dependence (Lancaster (1990)). Controlling for the observed character-
istics of the workers the negative time-dependency is less pronounced. From ﬁgure 5
we can see that most of the transitions from unemployment to subsidised employment
are within the ﬁrst year after the workers get eligible.24 The decrease in the transition
rate after the 15th month in paid-unemployment can be explained by the availability of
slightly higher subsidies thereafter.25 Figure 6 shows that we also have negative time
dependence for the transitions from employment to non-employment.
4 Econometric Model
We model the labour market trajectories of young long-term unemployed workers from
the moment they enter paid-unemployment until they leave their ﬁrst employment spell.
Figure 7 illustrates the transitions between the different labour market states considered
in our empirical model. At the beginning all workers are in unemployment. They can
have two competing transitions: either the workers have a transition to subsidised em-
ployment or they have a transition to regular employment. Once the workers are in
employment (either regular or subsidised) the only possible transition is to non-employ-
ment. Our main interest is in the right hand side of ﬁgure 7, i.e. the causal effect of
subsidies on the transition rate from employment to non-employment.
To capture the dynamic nature of the effects we explicitly allow them to vary over
23For the moment we ignore the characteristics of the participants and non-participants.
24Recall that the workers get eligible after 12 months of unemployment, including the 9 months waiting
period.
25Remember that the Recruitment Plan provides a different subsidy scheme for workers which are unem-
ployed for more than 24 months.
11time. We estimate the effect in the ﬁrst and the second year of subsidised employment
and after the end of the subsidies.
We cannot identify job-to-job changes in the analysis. For purposes of interpretation
it is important to realise that the subsidy is assigned to a working contract: if a subsidised
worker moves form one job to another, the subsidy necessarily comes to an end. Tran-
sitions from subsidised to unsubsidised employment are therefore necessarily job-to-job
changes, unless the transition occurs after the end of the entitlement period.
To estimate the effect of participation in subsidised employment we have to take into
account that the participants might be systematically different from the workers in the
control group. The group of participants might constitute a particular selection of work-
ers. Therefore, a valid causal analysis requires that we control for the characteristics of
the workers (Heckman et al. (1999), Costa-Dias and Blundell (2002)). Since the subsidy is
provided to the employer, we cannot a priori assume that the ”participating” employer
are comparable to the non-participating ones. Typically, microeconometric evaluation
studies control only for selection of the participating workers. If this is the case then the
effect of participation of the workers on their labour market outcome could reﬂect the
effect of the actual subsidy as well as the selection of the employer. To take selection
problems into account, we will therefore control for the characteristics of the workers
and employers. We include a large set of explanatory variables in our duration model.
These variables contain information about individual characteristics, the household of
the worker, the local labour market conditions and the employer. We refer to section 3
for the description of the available data.
Besides controlling for observable characteristics of workers and employers in our
main analysis, we allow for selection in unobservable characteristics of the workers in
the sensitivity analysis.26
Tocontrolforselectioninunobservablesfortheworkerwefollowanapproachsimilar
toAbbringand vandenBerg(2003b). Themain ideais toallowfordependenciesofunob-
served heterogeneity (UH) terms in the different transitions by specifying a multivariate
distribution for the unobserved heterogeneity terms. For the implementation we have to
26It would be interesting to develop empirical models which control for selection in unobservable charac-
teristic of workers and employers.
12include the transitions to subsidised/regular employment in our empirical model. We
can identify the unobserved heterogeneity within our duration model conditional on
some structural assumptions. For a discussion of identiﬁcation of the multivariate mixed
proportional hazard model we refer to Heckman and Honoré (1989) and Abbring and
van den Berg (2003a) and for a recent non-technical summary to van den Berg (2005).27
Identiﬁcation requires the presence of two continuous explanatory variables, which have
different effects on the transition rates to the competing outcomes (subsidised and regu-
lar employment).28 We include three continuous variables in our model: unemployment
rates, age and the moment of entry into paid-unemployment. The age variable and the
moment of entryare only available in groupedform (i.e. years of age and monthof entry)
and provide therefore only a proxy to real continuous variables.
The labour market states can only be observed at the end of each quarter but we
have information about the inﬂow into paid-unemployment on a monthly basis. This
information can be used to identify monthly transition rates out of unemployment. The
following example illustrates why this is the case. Let us assume that there are workers
who have entered unemployment at the start of June and who have left unemployment
already by the end of the second quarter, i.e. June. Since, for these workers we know
with certainty that they had a transition during their ﬁrst month of paid-unemployment,
this information allows us to identify the transition rates out of unemployment for the
ﬁrst month. Furthermore let us assume that there is a second group of workers who
enter unemployment at the start of May and who have left unemployment by the end of
June. For these workers we know that they had a transition during their ﬁrst two months
of unemployment. Now, since we know already the transition rate for the ﬁrst month
(identiﬁed by the ﬁrst group), the workers who leave within a two-month interval enable
us to identify the transition rates out of unemployment for the second month, and so on.
It is important for identiﬁcation of the monthly transition rates that the time-intervals in
which the transitions occur have a partial overlap. Our example shows that identiﬁcation
27The identiﬁcation is different from what is known as the “timing-of-events” approach (Abbring and
van den Berg (2003b)) which has frequently been applied for evaluation purposes in the last years.
28More exactly, the joint support of the explanatory variables has to contain a non-empty open set in
R
2 and the vectors of the corresponding parameters must form a non-singular matrix. One possibility to
weaken the identifying assumptions considerably would be the inclusion of repeated observations. See
Honoré (1993) and Abbring and van den Berg (2003a).
13of monthly transition rates is possible, despite the fact that the labour market states can
only be observed at the end of each quarter. Ignoring this information would lead to
estimates which are less precise, since we would not use all available information about
the duration. We show how to integrate the information about the monthly inﬂow when
deriving the individual likelihood contributions.
The likelihood-function
Since the maximum likelihood function of the model without multivariate unobserved
heterogeneity can be represented as a restricted version of the more general model, we
present only the latter one, here.
Wespecifyacompetingrisks,multivariate mixedproportionalhazard model(vanden
Berg (2001)) and distinguish four different labour market states: unemployment u, reg-
ular employment r, employment starting with subsidies p and ﬁnally non-employment
n.
We only consider the transitions of ﬁgure 7 between these four states and workers
who have a different transition are right-censored, one time period before. In the case
where no transition is observed, the respective spell is right-censored at the end of the
observation period.
Speciﬁcationofthetransition rates Asmentionedabovewespecifyamixedproportional
hazard model where explanatory variables x and the unobservables V shift a baseline haz-
ard λ(t) for each transition proportionally. Using the letter l for the origin state m for
the destination state, the transition rates θlm(t|·) for the four possible transitions can be
written as:
θlm(t|x,Vm) = λlm(t) · exp(x′βlm + Vm) (1)
where lm ∈ {ur,up,rn,pn}.
We we assume that V = (Vr,Vp,Vn) are draws from a trivariate random distribution.
These draws are assumed to be independent of the observed explanatory variables x. In
a speciﬁcation without unobserved heterogeneity the V ’s are simply zero.
14We specify a piecewise constant hazard rate which implies that we can write the
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k ] means that the transition from one state to another occurs
in the k-th period. This type of model is referred to as a grouped duration model in the
literature (Prentice and Gloeckler (1978), Kiefer (1988)).
The survival rate in unemployment at the end of the k-th time period is noted by









The survival rates in subsidised employment Sp and regular employment Sr are simpli-
ﬁed versions of equation 2 and can be found in the appendix.













k +δ2 for the employment duration after participation in subsidised employ-
ment
We also restrict βpn = βrn. This is equivalent to a modelwhere we estimate one transition
rate from employment to non-employment and the effects of subsidised employment are
captured by a time-varying dummy structure.
Individual contributions to the likelihood
The contributions to the likelihood function depend on the individual trajectories on the
labour market.30 Using the notation for the conditional transition- and survival rates of
equation 1 and 2 we can summarise the individual likelihood contributions as:
29Note that for origin state u we have monthly periods. For the other origin states (r and p) we have
quarterly periods. Note also that t
lm
0 ≡ 0 and t
lm
K = +∞.

















Su(tk−1|·)cu × Sr(tl−1|·)cr × Sp(tl−1|·)cp
Although not explicitly written, all terms used in equation 3 are conditional on a set
of (possibly time-varying) explanatory variables and are subject to the above mentioned
assumptions. We suppress these elements from the notation for the purpose of simpli-
ﬁcation. The indicator variables du,dr,dp are equal to one if the worker has a transition
out of the respective state and zero otherwise. cu,cr,cp are indicators which are one if the
workeris censored in the respective state and zero otherwise. Finally pup indicates a tran-
sition to subsidised employment. The individual contributions to the likelihood can be
represented by a combination of these indicators, e.g. if a worker has pup = du = dp = 1
and the other indicators are equal to zero then the worker has a transition from unem-
ployment to subsidised employment and a transition out of subsidised employment. All
the other components in equation 3 are then neutralised. Equation 3 covers all possible
trajectories of our model, including right censoring.
The ﬁrst line of equation 3 represents the individual likelihood contribution for the
competing transitions out of unemployment. Note that we incorporate the information
about the month of inﬂow into paid-unemployment.31 The variable s indicates if the
worker leaves unemployment within a one, two or three months interval after entering
paid-unemployment.32
There is only one possible destination state for transitions out of employment. There-
fore the individual likelihood contribution for a transition out of employment is just the
difference between the survival rate at the end of the transition-period and the survival
rate at the end of the preceding period.
31For the derivation of the formula we refer to the appendix.
32The indicator s ensures that the equation of the likelihood contribution is adapted to the accuracy of the
observation.
16The last line of equation 3 contains the likelihood contribution of workers who are
censored. Their contribution is equal to the survival rate at the end of the observation
period that precedes the period of the censoring event.
The likelihood contribution in the case of unobserved heterogeneity (UH): Given
the independence assumption for V we can integrate out the unobserved heterogene-





lm(V )dG(V ) (4)
where G(V ) is the joint distribution of the heterogeneity terms.
Speciﬁcation of the heterogeneity distribution: Suppose that vm(m ∈ {r,p,n}) can
take two values vm1 and vm2 for each possible destination state m. This results in a dis-
crete joint heterogeneity distribution with eight points of support. The associated proba-











They are shown to remain computationally feasible while providing the desired ﬂexibil-
ity for the correlation of unobserved components (van den Berg (2001)).









Pabc · lm(vra,vpb,vnc) (6)
The equations for the different transition rates and the multivariate distribution for
the unobserved heterogeneity are estimated simultaneously by the means of maximum
likelihood.
When specifying our econometric model we tried to minimise the structural assump-
17tions we had to impose. This is the reason why we specify a ﬂexible piecewise constant
baseline hazard and the unobserved heterogeneity as a discrete distribution.
5 Estimation Results
In this section we concentrate on the key results of our estimation, namely the estimates
of the effect of participation in subsidised employment on the transition rate from em-
ployment to non-employment. For the estimation results of other explanatory variables
and the baseline hazards we refer to table 2 and table 3 in the appendix.
As explained above, in our empirical model the effect of subsidised employment is
summarised by three parameters. Two of them are for the ﬁrst and the second year of
subsidised employment. These two parameters allow to capture time-varying effects
which may result from the change in the level of the subsidies after one year. The third
parameter captures a potential effect of participation after the subsidised employment
period.
To control for selection we include a large set of explanatory variables in our mixed
proportional hazard model. We have variables about individual characteristics such as
age, citizenship, school degree and the month of entry into paid-unemployment. The
variables for the household characteristics are the position of the worker in the house-
hold and the number of small children in the household. To capture differences in the
local unemployment market we also include the local unemployment rates and regional
dummies. In addition, we include the time in the preceding unemployment spell as a ex-
planatory variable for the duration in employment. Like explained above, all workers in
our database enter paid-unemployment after a waiting period of nine months and have
no previous employment spells. The database is stratiﬁed with respect to the gender of
the workers.
The upper part of table 4 shows the parameter estimates for the effect of participa-
tion in subsidised employment when we control only for the (observed) characteristics
of the workers. We ﬁnd a signiﬁcant negative effect of participation in subsidised em-
ployment on the transition rate from employment to non-employment during the ﬁrst
year of subsidised employment. The (non-signiﬁcant) estimates for the 2nd year of sub-
18sidised employment and the period after the subsidised employment indicate that the
effect for women vanishes and is even reversed for the men.
However,thedescriptivestatisticsinsection3indicatesigniﬁcant differencesbetween
the observed characteristics of the employers of regular and subsidised workers. These
differences might affect the labour market outcome. Whenwe controlonly for thecharac-
teristics of the workers it would be hard to distinguish between the effect of the subsidies
and the selection of employers.
Table 4: Estimated effect of temporary subsidies on the transition rates from employment
to non-employment
1st year 2nd year after the subsidies total effect
obs. char. of workers
women −29%∗ −22% +5% −25%∗
men −36%∗ +36% +60% −21%∗
obs. char. of workers and employers
women −30%∗ −23% −7% −26%∗
men −36%∗ +38% +34% −22%∗
obs. char. workers and employers and UH
women −7% −26% +6% −8%
men −48% −22% +1% −53%
Note: Estimates which are marked by a
∗ are signiﬁcant different from zero at the 95% conﬁdence level.
The upper part reports the estimates when we control for the observed characteristics of the workers. The
middle part when controlling for observed characteristics of workers and employers. The lower part refers
to the case where we allow for selection in unobserved heterogeneity (UH ) for the worker.
To control for selection in the characteristics of the employer we include their ob-
servedcharacteristics inourempirical model, inthenextstep. Weincludesector-dummies,
information about the size of the employer and some dummies to control for a particular
nature of employers.33 The middle part of table 4 summarises the effects of participation
in subsidised employment on the transition rate from employment to non-employment,
when we control for the characteristics of the workers as well as for the characteristics of
the employer.
Theestimationresultswithandwithoutemployercharacteristics are remarkable close
to each other. It seems that in our study the differences in the characteristics between the
participating and the non-participating employers do not play a decisive role for the ef-
33Like self-employment, or local public administration.
19fects on the employment duration during the ﬁrst and second year of the subsidy. Only
the parameter estimates for the time after the subsidy appear to be different, however
they are characterised by large standard errors.
During the ﬁrst year of employment the transition rate from employment to non-
employment is signiﬁcantly lower for workers in subsidised employment. The reduction
in the transition rate is 30% for women and 36% for men. The estimates for the sec-
ond year and after the end of the subsidies suggest that this effect is not persistent. The
parameters indicate that the effect of the subsidies goes down for women and is even re-
versed for men. However these estimates are characterised by large standard errors and
should be interpreted with caution.
Note that the results are compatible with the economic intuition provided by the the-
oretical literature. Mortensenand Pissarides (2003) argue that a hiring subsidy would lead
to shorter unemployment durations but increase unemployment incidence and lead con-
sequently to a higher turnover on the labour market. In contrast, permanent employment
subsidies lead to higher employment whereas the new steady state is characterised by a
lower reservation productivity. Therefore a permanent ﬂow of employment subsidies in-
creases the expected employment duration. A temporary employment subsidy could be
regardedas a policy whichlies inbetweenhiring subsidiesand a permanentemployment
subsidy since it shares characteristics of both policies.34 During the subsidy the situation
is similar to the case of a permanent subsidy: the ﬂow of subsidies can be expected to
lower the reservation productivity and would consequently lead to a lower transition
rate out of employment. Similar to a hiring subsidy, a temporary employment subsidy
increases the opportunitycost of maintaining a match after the end of the subsidy. This is
due to the fact that the employer could lay off and search another worker who is entitled
to the subsidy.
When the intuition of this model is translated into our empirical model then we
would expect lower transition rates out of employment during a temporary employment
subsidy and higher transition rates after the end of the subsidy. Roughly speaking the
results in table 4 are in line with this prediction. However we should keep in mind that,
34Acomplete analysisof the dynamics of temporaryemploymentsubsidiesinanon-stationary framework
is beyond the scope of this paper.
20different from Mortensen and Pissarides (2003) who model job-duration, here we are in-
vestigate the effects on employment duration.35
If the employment duration is indeed longer during the subsidies we could have ad-
ditional effects which are not considered in the discussed theoretical model. For example
longer employment duration during the ﬁrst year of subsidies could have an impact on
the accumulation of human capital on the job which itself could have an effect on em-
ployment duration.
It is not obvious to infer the total effect on the employment duration from the time-
varying effects. Especially for the men it is not immediately clear if the negative effect
of the transition rate out of employment for the ﬁrst year are counter-balanced by the
positive effects in the second year and after the subsidised employment. For the total
effect one has to consider that the time-varying effects apply only conditional on staying
in employment over time. For example the effect for the second year applies only con-
ditional on staying in subsidised employment for at least one year. This implies that the
number of workers who are actually affected by the time-varying effects declines with
time. The survival rates in ﬁgure 2 and 3 suggest that the number of workers who are
concerned by the effects declines with time.36 The number of workers who are affected
by the negative effect during the ﬁrst year of subsidised employment is larger than the
number of workers who is affected by the positive effects afterwards. To complete our
results we report the total (non-timevarying) effects of participation on the transition rate
out of employment. As we can see from table 4 the effects for the ﬁrst year outweigh
the effects for the second year and after subsidised employment and the total effect on
the transition rate is negative for all estimations. This translates into a longer expected
employment duration caused by participation in subsidised employment.37
As a sensitivity analysis we estimate a model where we allow for correlation in un-
35By concentrating on the employment duration we allow for change of the employer. This is different
from Mortensen and Pissarides (2003) where a destroyed jobs lead necessarily to unemployment.
36Figure 2 and 3 refer to time in employment that started with subsidised employment. This is different
from time in subsidised employment since it also comprises workers in employment after an interruption of
the subsidised employment.
37Under the strong assumption of “absence of general-equilibrium effects” a cost-beneﬁt analysis could
be based on the comparison of the total effect on the employment duration and the cost of the subsidies.
The effect on the employment duration could itself have an impact on the duration of subsequent
non/unemployment spells, e.g. via networking or the accumulation of human capital. See Cockx and Gö-
bel (2005) and Cockx and Göbel (2006) for an empirical analysis of the effect of participation in subsidised
employment on the subsequent unemployment duration.
21observed heterogeneity terms of the different transitions. Like described in section 4 our
estimates might be biased if the participants in the subsidised employment program are
a non-random sample with respect to their unobserved characteristics. If this is the case,
the estimates would reﬂect this selection. The lower part of table 4 provides the results
of the model with unobserved characteristics. The estimates for the effect of subsidised
employment maintain their general pattern: The parameter estimates indicate that the
transition rate from employment to non-employment during the subsidies is lower for
participants. After the end of the subsidies a preceding participation causes a higher
transition rate out of employment. However the standard errors get large and none of
the parameters of interest is signiﬁcant any more. Expanding our study to a longer time
period could be helpful to get more robust estimates. This would allow us to integrate
repeated participation in our empirical model. Honoré (1993) shows that this is helpful
for identiﬁcation.
6 Conclusion
Inthis paperweestimatedtheeffect ofparticipation insubsidisedemploymentforyoung
long-term unemployed workers. The analysed subsidy has the form of a reduction of
social insurance contributions which is provided to the employer for two years. This
paper provides causal evidence on the effect of subsidies on employment duration. By
focusing on the effect of program participation on the employment duration we contrast
subsidised employment to a hypothetical situation where a worker would have found a
regular employment instead.
We show how a multivariate mixed proportional hazard model can be used, in the
presence of non-random selection, to evaluate the effect of participation in subsidised
employment on the employment duration. The model has the virtue of providing a way
to control for selection in unobserved characteristics. To phrase it more cautiously, mul-
tivariate MPH-models can be used for a sensitivity analysis - they allow to test if results
obtained by classical proportional hazard models are robust with respect to selection in
unobservable characteristics.
Controlling for a large set of observable characteristics, our estimates indicate that
22the subsidies have a positive effect on the duration in employment during the ﬁrst year
of participation in subsidised employment. We don’t ﬁnd signiﬁcant effects in the sec-
ond year or after participation in subsidised employment. The estimates indicate that the
effect of participation in subsidised employment diminishes over time. The total effect
on the transition rate from employment to non-employment is negative. Therefore, the
expected duration in employment increases because of a participation in the subsidised
employmentprogram. However, when controlling for selection in unobserved character-
istics it turns out that the standard error get large and statistical inference is not feasible.
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26Appendix
A Individual contributions to the likelihood
For the initial unemployment state we deﬁne two random durations:
Tur := the random duration until regular employment
Tup := the random duration until subsidised employment
For the subsequent employment state we distinguish:
Trn := the random duration in regular employment until non-employment
Tpn := the random duration in employment until to non-employment, whereas the
employment spell starts with subsidies.
We assume that all individual differences in the joint distribution T = (Tup,Tur,Trn,Tpn)
can be characterised by explanatory variables X, V where X is observed and V is not.
The joint distribution T|X,V can be expressed in terms of the distributions (Tup|X =
x,V ), (Tur|X = x,V ), (Tpn|Tu = tu,X = x,V ) (Trn|Tu = tu,X = x,V ). The latter
distributions are characterised by their transition rates:
θup(t|x,V ), θur(t|x,V ), θpn(t|tu,x,V ), θrn(t|tu,x,V ).
See equation 1 for the speciﬁcation of the transition rates.
Let V := (Vp,Vr,Vn) be a (3 × 1)-vector of unobserved covariates.
Let Tur ⊥ ⊥ (Vp,Vn)|x,Vr, implying that θur(t|x,V ) = θur(t|x,Vr)
Let Tup ⊥ ⊥ (Vr,Vn)|x,Vp, implying that θup(t|x,V ) = θup(t|x,Vp)
Let Trn ⊥ ⊥ (Vr,Vp)|tu,x,Vn, implying that θrn(t|tu,x,V ) = θrn(t|tu,x,Vn)
and Tpn ⊥ ⊥ (Vr,Vp)|tu,x,Vn, implying that θpn(t|tu,x,V ) = θpn(t|tu,x,Vn).
Depending on the individual labour market trajectories the contributions to the likeli-
hood are different. We can distinguish the following cases:
1. Right censored at unemployment duration tk:


















The individual likelihood contribution in the case of right censoring at unemployment
duration tk is the survival rate in a competing risk model at the end of the time period
tk. Note that we do not assume independence between the different transitions in the
competing risk speciﬁcation of the model.
272. Leaving for regular employment within (tk−1,tk+s] (for s ∈ {0,1,2}) and right cen-
sored in regular employment after tl quarters:



























































Sr(tl|tu = tk+s) (13)
where in the last line (and the sequel) the conditioning on x and V is implicit. Again we
allow for possible dependencies between the different transitions of the model.
See Cockx (1997) for derivation from equation (11) to equation (12). Note that we
consider an interval wider than 1 month: (tk−1,tk+s] for s ∈ {0,1,2} rather tan (tk−1,tk].
The reason is that during unemploymentwe observe the elapsed duration in months, but
the transitions only with a precision up to a quarter. In general, s = 2. However, if an
individual enterswithinthe last monthofthe quarterand has already left unemployment
by the end of the quarter, then s = 0. Similarly, s = 1 if one enters in the second month
and leaves by the end of the ﬁrst quarter.
3. Leaving for regular employment within (tk−1,tk+s] (for s ∈ {0,1,2}) and leaving for
non-employment within (tl−1,tl].










[Sr(tl−1) − Sr(tl)] (14)
4. Leaving for programme participation within (tk−1,tk+s] and right censored during
programme participation at tl










Sp(tl|tur = tk+s) (15)
285. Leavingforprogrammeparticipation within(tk−1,tk+s]andleavingtonon-employment
from programme participation within (tl−1,tl].










[Sp(tl−1) − Sp(tl)] (16)
See equation 3 in section 4 for a compact way of writing the individual likelihood
contributions.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
women men
all regular subsid. all regular subsid.
employm. employm. employm. employm.
Number of workers 8720 3156 257 6497 2776 246
INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS:
Age at the end of 1997 20.4 20.8 20.6 20.5 20.7 20.7
standard error 2.0 2.0 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.0
Nationality
Belgian 87.8% 91.4% 87.9% 89.1% 89.4% 88.6%
EU not Belgian 5.4% 4.6% 7.4% 5.1% 5.6% 7.3%
Not EU 6.8% 4.0% 4.7% 5.8% 5.0% 4.1%
School degree
Primary school 7.9% 3.6% 5.1% 12.0% 9.1% 7.7%
Lower secondary school 22.1% 13.4% 14.0% 27.5% 23.2% 23.6%
Higher secondary school 48.0% 49.2% 53.3% 42.3% 45.2% 49.2%
College - non-university 12.4% 19.2% 14.4% 8.5% 10.3% 10.6%
College - university 5.1% 7.7% 6.2% 4.4% 5.8% 3.7%
Other education 0.8% 0.5% 0.8% 0.9% 0.7% 1.2%
Unknown education 3.8% 6.3% 6.2% 4.4% 5.7% 4.1%
Month of entry in paid-unemployment
Month of entry 1,2,7,8,9,10,11,12 27.4% 20.8% 24.1% 30.5% 28.2% 25.6%
Month of entry 3,5,6 40.5% 42.0% 40.1% 42.4% 43.4% 38.6%
Month of entry 4 32.1% 37.3% 35.8% 27.1% 28.4% 35.8%
Characteristics of the household:
Head of the household (o.t.h.) 9.6% 6.6% 8.2% 8.4% 7.0% 7.3%
Husband/wife of the head o.t.h. 5.5% 3.4% 3.9%
Son/daughter of the head o.t.h. 72.5% 80.4% 82.1% 84.9% 86.7% 87.8%
Other family relationships to the head o.t.h. 2.3% 1.7% 1.2% 3.0% 2.9% 2.4%
No family relationship to the head o.t.h. 10.1% 8.0% 4.7% 3.7% 3.4% 2.4%
Number of persons in the household
Indicator (# of persons in the household [0-3) > 0 ) 10.0% 5.1% 7.4% 3.2% 2.7% 2.0%
Mean (# of persons in the household [0-3)) 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.4
Indicator (# of persons in the household [3-12) > 0
)
15.2% 12.9% 14.0% 15.7% 15.0% 11.4%
Mean (# of persons in the household [3-12)) 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4
Total # of persons in the household 2.7 2.7 2.9 2.8 2.8 2.9
standard error 1.9 1.6 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.7
LABOUR MARKET CHARACTERISTICS:
Local unemployment rate at the end of 1997 26.9 25.7 27.6 18.5 17.8 19.6
standard error 8.4 8.6 7.7 6.7 7.0 6.2
Region of residence
Flemish region 24.8% 31.0% 21.4% 19.6% 24.1% 12.6%
Walloon region 63.8% 59.1% 66.5% 67.7% 64.8% 73.6%
Brussels region 11.5% 9.9% 12.1% 12.7% 11.1% 13.8%
EMPLOYER CHARACTERISTICS:
Sector
Manufacture of food products and beverages 1.3% 3.5% 1.3% 2.9%
Construction 0.1% 1.2% 4.5% 18.3%
Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and
motorcycles, repair of personal and household
goods
11.0% 20.6% 4.2% 7.3%
Hotels and restaurants 5.4% 12.5% 4.7% 10.2%
Other business activities 28.7% 20.2% 37.0% 24.0%
Public administration and defence, compulsory
social security
11.1% 0.0% 8.7% 0.0%
Education 8.0% 1.6% 2.5% 1.6%
Health and social work 14.8% 17.9% 4.4% 8.1%
30women men
all regular subsid. all regular subsid.
employm. employm. employm. employm.
Agriculture, hunting and forestry 1.9% 1.2% 2.7% 2.0%
Manufacturing, Recycling 2.2% 4.7% 8.2% 6.1%
Electricity, gas and water supply 1.1% 0.0% 1.3% 0.4%
Wholesale and sale, repair of motor vehicles,
motorcycles and personal and household goods
2.3% 4.3% 3.6% 7.7%
Transport, storage and communication 3.6% 0.8% 7.7% 5.7%
Financial intermediation 1.9% 0.8% 2.0% 0.0%
Real estate, renting and business activities 0.7% 2.3% 1.8% 2.0%
Other community, social and personal service
activities
4.3% 8.6% 4.3% 3.7%
Mining + Activities of households as employers of
domestic staff + Badly deﬁned activities
1.5% 0.0% 0.8% 0.0%
Employer is a APL-agency 9.4% 0.0% 6.1% 0.0%
Self-employment 0.1% 0.0% 0.3% 0.0%
Size
Indicator for the size of the employer 6.7 4.1 6.7 3.9
standard error 2.8 3.0 2.8 2.9
LABOUR MARKET TRAJECTORY:
# employment spells 0.7 1.5 1.4 0.8 1.5 1.4
# unemployment spells 1.3 1.8 1.6 1.4 1.8 1.7
# spells in total 2.0 3.4 3.0 2.2 3.3 3.1
Note: Regular employment refers to the workers who have a transition from unemployment to regular employment. Subsidised
employment refers to the workers who have a transition from unemployment to subsidised employment. All refers to all
workers at the beginning of the observation period.
31Table 2: Estimation results - women
-log (likelihood) 18578.6 18421.1
# parameters 101 110
# observations 8720 8720
no UH with UH
women b exp(b) p-value b exp(b) p-value
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES
Unemployment to regular employment
Age - mean(age) 0.009 1.009 0.363 0.011 1.011 0.991
Belgian
EU not Belgian −0.128 0.880 0.085 −0.132 0.876 0.895
Not EU −0.675 0.509 0.000 −0.735 0.480 0.463
Primary school −0.878 0.416 0.000 −0.939 0.391 0.348
Lower secondary school −0.574 0.563 0.000 −0.620 0.538 0.535
Higher secondary school
College - non-university 0.637 1.891 0.000 0.713 2.040 0.476
College - university 0.670 1.955 0.000 0.731 2.077 0.465
Other education −0.656 0.519 0.003 −0.700 0.497 0.484
Unknown education 0.904 2.469 0.000 0.944 2.569 0.345
Month of entry 1,2,7,8,9,10,11,12 −0.162 0.851 0.000 −0.176 0.839 0.860
Month of entry 3,5,6 0.049 1.051 0.165 0.062 1.064 0.950
Month of entry 4
Head of the household (o.t.h.) −0.220 0.802 0.000 −0.235 0.790 0.814
Husband/wife of the head o.t.h. −0.385 0.680 0.000 −0.417 0.659 0.676
Son/daughter of the head o.t.h.
Other family relationship to the head o.t.h. −0.238 0.788 0.051 −0.266 0.767 0.790
No family relationship to the head o.t.h. −0.101 0.904 0.083 −0.118 0.889 0.906
# of persons in the household [0-3) −0.527 0.590 0.000 −0.563 0.570 0.574
# of persons in the household [3-12) −0.054 0.947 0.083 −0.059 0.943 0.953
Local unemployment rate - quarter of entry −0.022 0.978 0.000 −0.024 0.976 0.981
Walloon region
Flemish region 0.289 1.335 0.000 0.334 1.397 0.738
Brussels region 0.037 1.038 0.535 0.055 1.056 0.956
Unemployment to subsidized employment
Age - mean(age) −0.022 0.979 0.641 −0.025 0.976 0.980
Belgian
EU not Belgian 0.188 1.207 0.444 0.211 1.235 0.833
Not EU −0.577 0.562 0.088 −0.706 0.494 0.480
Primary school −0.711 0.491 0.036 −0.814 0.443 0.416
Lower secondary school −0.681 0.506 0.001 −0.775 0.461 0.438
Higher secondary school
College - non-university 0.491 1.633 0.022 0.686 1.986 0.493
College - university 0.765 2.149 0.013 0.973 2.647 0.330
Other education −0.288 0.750 0.711 −0.375 0.687 0.708
Unknown education 1.809 6.106 0.000 2.133 8.438 0.033
Month of entry 1,2,7,8,9,10,11,12 −0.001 0.999 0.997 −0.051 0.950 0.959
Month of entry 3,5,6 0.050 1.051 0.742 0.075 1.078 0.940
Month of entry 4
Head of the household (o.t.h.) −0.261 0.770 0.302 −0.289 0.749 0.773
Husband/wife of the head o.t.h. −0.433 0.649 0.227 −0.518 0.596 0.604
Son/daughter of the head o.t.h.
Other family relationship to the head o.t.h. −0.758 0.469 0.230 −0.829 0.437 0.407
No family relationship to the head o.t.h. −0.789 0.454 0.012 −0.855 0.425 0.393
# of persons in the household [0-3) −0.203 0.816 0.400 −0.265 0.767 0.791
# of persons in the household [3-12) −0.110 0.896 0.366 −0.125 0.883 0.901
Local unemployment rate - quarter of entry −0.011 0.989 0.417 −0.015 0.985 0.988
Walloon region
Flemish region −0.062 0.940 0.818 0.007 1.007 0.994
Brussels region 0.164 1.178 0.468 0.222 1.249 0.824
32Table 2: Estimation results - women (continued)
no UH with UH
women b exp(b) p-value b exp(b) p-value
Employment to non-employment
Age - mean(age) −0.029 0.971 0.066 −0.043 0.958 0.966
Belgian
EU not Belgian 0.059 1.061 0.587 −0.021 0.980 0.983
Not EU −0.102 0.903 0.422 0.099 1.104 0.921
Primary school 0.548 1.730 0.000 0.928 2.529 0.353
Lower secondary school 0.264 1.302 0.000 0.426 1.531 0.670
Higher secondary school
College - non-university −0.192 0.826 0.009 −0.351 0.704 0.726
College - university −0.473 0.623 0.000 −0.699 0.497 0.485
Other education 0.239 1.270 0.408 0.634 1.885 0.526
Unknown education −1.297 0.273 0.000 −1.879 0.153 0.060
Month of entry 1,2,7,8,9,10,11,12 −0.078 0.925 0.212 −0.064 0.938 0.949
Month of entry 3,5,6 −0.080 0.923 0.121 −0.103 0.902 0.918
Month of entry 4
Head of the household (o.t.h.) 0.172 1.187 0.056 0.284 1.329 0.776
Husband/wife of the head o.t.h. 0.047 1.048 0.688 0.053 1.055 0.958
Son/daughter of the head o.t.h.
Other family relationship to the head o.t.h. 0.051 1.052 0.742 0.163 1.177 0.871
No family relationship to the head o.t.h. 0.160 1.174 0.057 0.217 1.242 0.829
# of persons in the household [0-3) 0.058 1.060 0.545 0.135 1.145 0.893
# of persons in the household [3-12) 0.031 1.031 0.500 0.084 1.088 0.933
Local unemployment rate - quarter of entry 0.007 1.007 0.122 0.013 1.013 0.989
Walloon region
Flemish region 0.125 1.133 0.143 0.125 1.133 0.901
Brussels region −0.039 0.961 0.651 −0.054 0.948 0.957
Manufacture of food products and beverages 0.004 1.004 0.981 0.124 1.132 0.901
Construction −0.255 0.775 0.593 −0.556 0.573 0.578
Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and
motorcycles; repair of personal and household
goods
−0.310 0.733 0.000 −0.560 0.571 0.576
Hotels and restaurants −0.184 0.832 0.088 −0.338 0.713 0.735
Other business activities
Public administration and defence; compulsory
social security
−0.665 0.514 0.000 −1.349 0.260 0.177
Education 0.189 1.208 0.035 0.238 1.269 0.812
Health and social work −0.525 0.592 0.000 −1.000 0.368 0.317
Agriculture, hunting and forestry 0.684 1.983 0.000 0.812 2.252 0.417
Manufacturing, Recycling −0.346 0.707 0.029 −0.655 0.519 0.513
Electricity, gas and water supply −0.692 0.500 0.036 −1.615 0.199 0.106
Wholesale and sale; repair of motor vehicles,
motorcycles and personal and household goods
−0.618 0.539 0.001 −1.231 0.292 0.219
Transport, storage and communication −1.069 0.343 0.000 −1.724 0.178 0.085
Financial intermediation −0.812 0.444 0.001 −1.772 0.170 0.077
Real estate, renting and business activities −0.725 0.484 0.033 −1.450 0.235 0.147
Other community, social and personal service
activities
−0.190 0.827 0.122 −0.489 0.613 0.625
Mining+Activities of households as employers of
domestic staff+Badly deﬁned activities
−1.152 0.316 0.000 −2.017 0.133 0.044
APL −0.309 0.734 0.003 −0.350 0.705 0.726
Self-employed 1.565 4.783 0.508 2.830 16.951 0.005
Size 0.010 1.010 0.830 0.008 1.008 0.993
Sizeˆ2 0.001 1.001 0.864 0.001 1.001 1.000
ln(unemployment-duration) −0.023 0.977 0.433 −0.102 0.903 0.919
Participation 1st year −0.353 0.703 0.002 −0.076 0.927 0.940
Participation 2nd year −0.265 0.767 0.397 −0.298 0.743 0.766
After participation −0.072 0.930 0.743 0.060 1.061 0.953
33Table 2: Estimation results - women (continued)
no UH with UH
women b exp(b) p-value b exp(b) p-value
BASELINE HAZARD
Unemployment to regular employment
Constant
Quarter 2 −0.121 0.886 0.026 −0.059 0.943 0.953
Quarter 3 −0.252 0.777 0.000 −0.149 0.862 0.882
Quarter 4,5 −0.305 0.737 0.000 −0.154 0.857 0.877
Quarter 6,7 −0.308 0.735 0.000 −0.095 0.910 0.924
Quarter 8,9,10,11 −0.497 0.609 0.000 −0.224 0.799 0.823
Unemployment to subsidized employment
Quarter 1
Constant
Quarter 3 −0.374 0.688 0.082 −0.229 0.795 0.819
Quarter 4 −0.646 0.524 0.010 −0.445 0.641 0.656
Quarter 5 0.169 1.185 0.382 0.447 1.563 0.655
Quarter 6,7,8,9,10,11 −1.852 0.157 0.000 −1.429 0.240 0.153
Employment to non-employment
Constant
Quarter 2 −0.686 0.504 0.000 −0.243 0.785 0.808
Quarter 3 −1.010 0.364 0.000 −0.323 0.724 0.746
Quarter 4 −0.658 0.518 0.000 0.255 1.290 0.799
Quarter 5,6 −1.411 0.244 0.000 −0.272 0.762 0.786
Quarter 7,8,9,10 −1.848 0.158 0.000 −0.293 0.746 0.770
DISTRIBUTION - Unobserved heterogeneity
Points of support
Unemployment to regular employment 1 −2.294 0.101 0.000 −2.013 0.134 0.044
Unemployment to regular employment 2 −3.051 0.047 0.002
Unemployment to subsidized employment 1 −4.729 0.009 0.000 −3.691 0.025 0.000
Unemployment to subsidized employment 2 -inf
Employment to non-employment 1 −0.997 0.369 0.000 0.082 1.086 0.935
Employment to non-employment 2 −2.270 0.103 0.023
Probability parameters: lam_rpn
lam_111 1.266 3.546 0.206
lam_112 2.458 11.679 0.014
lam_121 1.793 6.007 0.073
lam_122 1.600 4.951 0.110
lam_211 −0.038 0.963 0.970
lam_212 −2.542 0.079 0.011














34Table 3: Estimation results - men
-log (likelihood) 15897.8 15767.4
# parameters 95 103
# observations 6497 6497
no UH with UH
men b exp(b) p-value b exp(b) p-value
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES
Unemployment to regular employment
Age - mean(age) −0.021 0.980 0.066 −0.024 0.976 0.072
Belgian
EU not Belgian −0.010 0.990 0.899 −0.010 0.990 0.917
Not EU −0.103 0.902 0.222 −0.122 0.885 0.205
Primary school −0.569 0.566 0.000 −0.662 0.516 0.000
Lower secondary school −0.403 0.668 0.000 −0.466 0.627 0.000
Higher secondary school
College - non-university 0.314 1.369 0.000 0.380 1.462 0.000
College - university 0.338 1.402 0.000 0.394 1.483 0.000
Other education −0.628 0.534 0.004 −0.735 0.479 0.003
Unknown education 0.731 2.077 0.000 0.770 2.159 0.000
Month of entry 1,2,7,8,9,10,11,12 0.021 1.021 0.657 0.004 1.004 0.949
Month of entry 3,5,6 0.139 1.149 0.001 0.148 1.160 0.002
Month of entry 4
Head of the household (o.t.h.) −0.143 0.867 0.036 −0.169 0.845 0.031
Son/daughter of the head o.t.h.
Other family relationship to the head o.t.h. −0.017 0.983 0.866 0.006 1.006 0.956
No family relationship to the head o.t.h. 0.030 1.030 0.749 0.027 1.028 0.804
# of persons in the household [0-3) −0.194 0.824 0.034 −0.231 0.794 0.028
# of persons in the household [3-12) −0.002 0.998 0.950 −0.006 0.994 0.869
Local unemployment rate - quarter of entry −0.016 0.985 0.000 −0.021 0.979 0.000
Walloon region
Flemish region 0.228 1.256 0.002 0.249 1.282 0.004
Brussels region 0.067 1.069 0.248 0.094 1.098 0.162
Unemployment to subsidized employment
Age - mean(age) −0.023 0.977 0.586 −0.103 0.902 0.090
Belgian
EU not Belgian 0.267 1.305 0.318 −0.011 0.989 0.977
Not EU −0.335 0.716 0.347 −0.376 0.687 0.440
Primary school −0.781 0.458 0.005 −1.294 0.274 0.001
Lower secondary school −0.472 0.624 0.009 −0.854 0.426 0.001
Higher secondary school
College - non-university 0.310 1.364 0.193 0.451 1.570 0.204
College - university 0.141 1.151 0.710 0.645 1.907 0.289
Other education 0.017 1.017 0.979 0.944 2.569 0.514
Unknown education 1.190 3.286 0.003 1.933 6.910 0.002
Month of entry 1,2,7,8,9,10,11,12 −0.285 0.752 0.113 −0.135 0.874 0.624
Month of entry 3,5,6 −0.236 0.789 0.126 −0.305 0.737 0.185
Month of entry 4
Head of the household (o.t.h.) −0.285 0.752 0.300 −0.789 0.454 0.046
Son/daughter of the head o.t.h.
Other family relationship to the head o.t.h. −0.243 0.784 0.580 −1.145 0.318 0.039
No family relationship to the head o.t.h. −0.332 0.717 0.469 −0.462 0.630 0.476
# of persons in the household [0-3) −0.171 0.843 0.602 0.870 2.387 0.037
# of persons in the household [3-12) −0.224 0.799 0.125 −0.524 0.592 0.007
Local unemployment rate - quarter of entry −0.007 0.993 0.667 0.002 1.002 0.937
Walloon region
Flemish region −0.397 0.673 0.222 −0.480 0.619 0.311
Brussels region 0.277 1.319 0.199 0.731 2.078 0.023
Employment to non-employment
35Table 3: Estimation results - men (continued)
no UH with UH
men b exp(b) p-value b exp(b) p-value
Age - mean(age) −0.029 0.971 0.085 −0.034 0.967 0.122
Belgian
EU not Belgian 0.116 1.123 0.237 0.104 1.110 0.440
Not EU 0.096 1.101 0.389 0.148 1.160 0.344
Primary school 0.628 1.874 0.000 0.899 2.456 0.000
Lower secondary school 0.321 1.379 0.000 0.451 1.569 0.000
Higher secondary school
College - non-university −0.197 0.821 0.044 −0.273 0.761 0.025
College - university −0.274 0.760 0.033 −0.355 0.701 0.024
Other education −0.314 0.731 0.238 −0.272 0.762 0.426
Unknown education −1.343 0.261 0.000 −1.690 0.185 0.000
Month of entry 1,2,7,8,9,10,11,12 0.139 1.149 0.033 0.179 1.196 0.036
Month of entry 3,5,6 0.031 1.031 0.600 0.028 1.029 0.712
Month of entry 4
Head of the household (o.t.h.) 0.322 1.380 0.000 0.368 1.445 0.003
Son/daughter of the head o.t.h.
Other family relationship to the head o.t.h. 0.063 1.065 0.660 0.083 1.087 0.662
No family relationship to the head o.t.h. −0.088 0.915 0.549 −0.134 0.875 0.486
# of persons in the household [0-3) 0.059 1.061 0.628 0.145 1.156 0.395
# of persons in the household [3-12) 0.006 1.006 0.895 0.014 1.014 0.829
Local unemployment rate – quarter of entry 0.001 1.001 0.864 0.007 1.007 0.420
Walloon region
Flemish region 0.136 1.145 0.193 0.118 1.125 0.396
Brussels region −0.037 0.964 0.656 −0.078 0.925 0.482
Manufacture of food products and beverages −0.268 0.765 0.225 −0.465 0.628 0.097
Construction −0.747 0.474 0.000 −0.999 0.368 0.000
Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and
motorcycles; repair of personal and household
goo
−0.231 0.794 0.068 −0.401 0.670 0.016
Hotels and restaurants −0.392 0.676 0.001 −0.527 0.590 0.001
Other business activities
Public administration and defence; compulsory
social security
−0.778 0.460 0.000 −1.061 0.346 0.000
Education −0.072 0.930 0.668 −0.141 0.868 0.515
Health and social work −0.732 0.481 0.000 −0.990 0.371 0.000
Agriculture, hunting and forestry 0.132 1.141 0.371 0.146 1.157 0.461
Manufacturing, Recycling −0.521 0.594 0.000 −0.757 0.469 0.000
Electricity, gas and water supply −0.767 0.464 0.012 −1.145 0.318 0.002
Wholesale and sale; repair of motor vehicles,
motorcycles and personal and household goods
−0.499 0.607 0.001 −0.709 0.492 0.000
Transport, storage and communication −0.903 0.405 0.000 −1.210 0.298 0.000
Financial intermediation −0.748 0.473 0.003 −1.121 0.326 0.000
Real estate, renting and business activities −0.975 0.377 0.000 −1.341 0.261 0.000
Other community, social and personal service
activities
−0.317 0.728 0.022 −0.492 0.611 0.006
Mining+Activities of households as employers of
domestic staff+Badly deﬁned activities
−0.928 0.395 0.007 −1.180 0.307 0.004
APL −0.184 0.832 0.284 −0.280 0.756 0.171
Self-employed −0.391 0.676 0.437 −0.571 0.565 0.396
Size −0.076 0.927 0.123 −0.102 0.903 0.109
Sizeˆ2 0.006 1.006 0.190 0.007 1.007 0.202
ln(unemployment-duration) −0.004 0.996 0.889 −0.073 0.930 0.415
Participation 1st year −0.453 0.636 0.000 −0.665 0.515 0.336
Participation 2nd year 0.321 1.378 0.222 −0.251 0.778 0.780
After participation 0.291 1.337 0.166 0.007 1.007 0.993
BASELINE HAZARD
Unemployment to regular employment
36Table 3: Estimation results - men (continued)
no UH with UH
men b exp(b) p-value b exp(b) p-value
Constant
Quarter 2 −0.146 0.865 0.016 −0.047 0.954 0.551
Quarter 3,4 −0.417 0.659 0.000 −0.243 0.784 0.019
Quarter 5,6 −0.253 0.776 0.000 0.018 1.018 0.903
Quarter 7,8 −0.383 0.682 0.000 −0.023 0.977 0.902
Quarter 9,10,11 −0.478 0.620 0.000 −0.040 0.961 0.849
Unemployment to subsidized employment
Quarter 1
Constant
Quarter 3,4 −0.521 0.594 0.003 −0.126 0.882 0.535
Quarter 5 0.020 1.020 0.917 0.944 2.571 0.003
Quarter 6,7,8,9,10,11 −1.824 0.161 0.000 −0.494 0.610 0.316
Employment to non-employment
Constant
Quarter 2 −0.313 0.731 0.000 −0.073 0.930 0.423
Quarter 3,4 −0.685 0.504 0.000 −0.246 0.782 0.049
Quarter 5,6,7,8,9,10 −1.490 0.225 0.000 −0.688 0.503 0.000
DISTRIBUTION - Unobserved heterogeneity
Points of support
Unemployment to regular employment 1 −2.474 0.084 0.000 −1.746 0.175 0.000
Unemployment to regular employment 2 −2.982 0.051 0.000
Unemployment to subsidized employment 1 −4.259 0.014 0.000 −1.935 0.144 0.001
Unemployment to subsidized employment 2 -inf
Employment to non-employment 1 −0.894 0.409 0.000 −0.036 0.965 0.910
Employment to non-employment 2 −1.650 0.192 0.000
Probability parameters: lam_rpn
lam_111 −4.218 0.015 0.946
lam_112 -inf
lam_121 −0.072 0.930 0.979
lam_122 1.661 5.263 0.574
lam_211 −0.298 0.743 0.919
lam_212 −0.298 0.743 0.916















Figure 1: Nonparametric survival rate for unemployment
Note: Time is measured from the month of inﬂow into paid-unemployment.
38Figure 2: Nonparametric survival rate for employment - female
Note: The time is measured after the quarter of the transition to employment.
Figure 3: Nonparametric survival rate for employment - male
Note: The time is measured after the quarter of the transition to employment.
39Figure 4: Time dependence: transition from unemployment to regular employment
Note: Broad lines are used for transition rates without controlling for observed charac-
teristics. Narrow lines are used transition rates when controlling for observed character-
istics.
The transition rate for the ﬁrst three months has been normalised to one for the purpose
of exposition.
The time is measured from the month of entry into paid-unemployment.
Figure 5: Time dependence: transition from unemployment to subsidised employment
Note: Broad lines are used for transition rates without controlling for observed charac-
teristics. Narrow lines are used transition rates when controlling for observed character-
istics.
The transition rate for the ﬁrst three months has been normalised to one for the purpose
of exposition.
The time is measured from the month of entry into paid-unemployment.
40Figure 6: Time dependence: transition from employment to non-employment
Note: Broad lines are used for transition rates without controlling for observed charac-
teristics. Narrow lines are used transition rates when controlling for observed character-
istics.
The transition rate for the ﬁrst three months has been normalised to one for the purpose
of exposition.
The time is measured after the quarter of the transition to employment.
Figure 7: Possible transitions in the model
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